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4. The comments we make below derive partly from comments and suggestions that were made to us by Office of Security personnel and partly from our own observations of the functioning of the Office during our survey. As outside observers, we were able to look at Security without the burden of tradition or the concerns that necessarily influence the viewpoints of management.

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5. While we commend the reduction of [] positions that would be achieved by the new organization, we are concerned that these savings were all achieved in the middle and lower grades. Not a single position of GS-15 or above was eliminated. Indeed, the only net change in position allocation above GS-15 was the conversion of one GS-16 slot to GS-15. This was achieved by the reduction of the position of the []

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[] to GS-15, a change widely regarded as long overdue. In effect, then, this reorganization proposal would result in an increase in the number of senior-level positions relative to the total strength of the Office. This has made possible raising all division chief positions, except two, from GS-15 to GS-16 (one was already at GS-16 level), and the creation of one new GS-17 position (Deputy Director for Policy and Management). Thus, the elimination of three GS-16 staff positions and one GS-17 deputy director position, as is proposed by the reorganization, achieves no net reduction in senior positions. In our view this results in a top-heavy grade structure in the Office of Security.

Recommendation:

That the senior grade levels proposed in this reorganization plan be reviewed by the Personnel Management and Compensation Division.

6. We do not suggest that the average grade level of the Office of Security be reduced by the full amount of the reductions suggested above. Rather, we suggest that a restudy be made of the proposal to reduce the number of GS-14 positions [] and the number of GS-13 positions by []. While many of the reductions of GS-14 positions may have been achieved by the elimination of super-25X9 visory positions, which we endorse, it is nevertheless a fact that the

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GS-13 and GS-14 level provides the journeyman backbone of the high quality performance we have come to expect of the Office of Security.

7. We were initially disturbed at the proposal to establish an Information Handling Group in the Directorate for Policy and Management to replace the existing Computer Security Branch in Physical Security Division. We have been assured, however, that this change of name does not signify that the Office of Security proposes to expand this unit's functions in the computer area beyond its current staff responsibility for computer security. (It is absorbing Security's new Top Secret Control responsibility.) While we recognize that the Office of Security needs to make greater use of the computer in carrying out its functions, we firmly believe it would be unwise to combine this function with Security's staff responsibility for computer security in the Agency. We think it is not unreasonable to expect the SIPS task force to give Security the technical assistance (including the feasibility studies) it needs to expand its computer applications. With respect to the name of this unit, we suggest that "ADP Security Group" would be less ambiguous than the name proposed.

8. We see no strong kinship between the ADP security function and the Top Secret Control function. Rather, there are logical reasons for assigning the TS Control responsibility to the Security Records Division.

Recommendation:

That the Top Secret Control function and two positions be placed in the Security Records Division.

9. In the past, responsibility for certifying clearances has been dispersed among several elements in the Office of Security. Certifications of TS clearances for Agency employees going to other agencies and certifications from other agencies for their employees are handled by different sections in Personnel Security Division, while certifications of compartmented clearances are handled by the Compartmented Information Branch of Security Records Division. The reorganization proposal improves the situation, but it does not go far enough. It centralizes the certification of non-compartmented clearances in the Clearance Division but leaves compartmented certifications in the Security Records Division. Since the certification process is largely

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mechanical and since the maintenance of clearance information is basically a record-keeping job, we think that it should all be in the Security Records Division, as is already the case for compartmented clearances.

Recommendation:

- a. That responsibility for certification of clearances be placed in the Compartmented Information Branch of the Security Records Division; and
- b. That the CIB be renamed the Clearance Certification Branch.

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11. We were told that the three Special Assistants to the Chief, Personnel Security Division, are to be placed in the new Operations Support Branch. The Special Assistants are concerned with assisting

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Agency personnel, not Agency operations. Also, the functions currently being performed in the Employee Activities Branch are to be placed in the new External Activities Branch, along with the proprietary office support function. (We have dealt with this latter function in paragraph 10, above.) We believe the Special Assistants' function should be combined with the Employee Activities Branch's functions into an appropriately titled branch.

Recommendation:

That the External Activities Branch be renamed the Employee Activities Branch; and that the three Special Assistants be placed in this branch.

12. We understand that certain of the functions of the Security Research Staff are to be placed in the new Research Branch of the Clearance Division, along with the reinvestigation program. We are concerned that the apparent reduction in the number of people assigned to some of the sensitive activities of SRS may result in decreased attention to two highly important programs carried on under SRS. We would urge that this not be allowed to occur.

13. We were told that the Case Analysis Branch, which is responsible for the initial checking of new applicants against Agency files, would be left in the Security Records Division under the reorganization. While we recognize the advantage of physically locating this branch close to the files in Security Records Division, as it now is, we do not believe this requires that the branch be under the supervision of the host Division. We found some duplication of this branch's work in the Personnel Security Division. We also have some concern about the ability of the branch to exercise the judgment required of it without the supervision and guidance of supervisors concerned with clearance function. The branch logically should be with the other clearance elements.

Recommendation:

That the Case Analysis Branch be placed organizationally in the new Clearance Division.

(Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Inspector General

cc: Director of Security

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